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Job Refusal in Unemployment Compensation
Claims
Robert J. Bowers*
U NEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION is a type of insurance. As such,
it does not cover losses intentionally incurred by claimants.
However, the spirit of the Social Security Act of 19351 and of
similar laws enacted in all the states affect the qualification or
disqualification of a claimant who refuses a job.
The broad discretionary powers of administrators and
boards of review preclude definitive answer. We must be content
with awareness of the tolerance limits indicated by stare decisis
and commission rules.
Suitable Work. Determination of what constitutes the "suit-
able work" mentioned in the statutes is, in general, a question of
fact, turning on the situation in a given case. 2 The principal
points considered in determining suitability of work are the fol-
lowing: (1) the degree of risk to health, safety and morals; 3
(2) physical fitness; 4 (3) prior training; 5 (4) experience;0 (5)
prior earnings; 7 (6) length of unemployment, and prospects of
gaining work in the customary occupation;8 (7) the distance of
* B.S. in B.A., Kent State University; Operations Analyst, National City
Bank, Cleveland, Ohio; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
I See, 1A C. C. H. Unemployment Insurance Reporter, Federal & All-State
Explanatory Guide, page 4208, 1020 (1963).
2 81 C. J. S., Social Security and Public Welfare, Sec. 201.
3 McComber v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 119 N. W. 2d 792
(Iowa, 1963); Wolf's v. Iowa Empl. Security Comm., 244 Iowa 999, 59 N. W.
2d 216 (1953); Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N. W.
2d 249 (1945); Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 150 Neb. 792, 36 N. W. 2d
233 (1949).
4 Deere Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 249
Iowa 1066, 90 N. W. 2d 750 (1958); Department of Labor and Industry v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 199 Pa. Rep. 594, 49 A. 2d
259 (1946); Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., supra n. 3; Suska v. Un-
employment Compensation Board of Review, 166 Pa. Super. 293, 70 A. 2d
397 (1950).
5 Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 7 So. 2d 303
(1942); Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N. H. 48, 45 A. 2d 886 (1946); Beecham v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., supra n. 3.
6 ibid.
7 Ibid.
s Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 4 Terry (Del.) 274,
46 A. 2d 137 (1946); Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., supra n. 3.
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available work from the claimant's residence; 9 and, (8) whether
or not the claimant is required to join a company union, or to
resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organiza-
tion.10
Health and Safety Aspect. The "health and safety" factor as
grounds for refusal of a job must be based upon substantial fact,
not on mere conjecture;" however, sincere trepidation properly
grounded may be considered just cause for a refusal.12 The claim-
ant's own appraisal of his health and physical ability is not suf-
ficient without substantiating factual evidence. 13 For this reason,
a claimant may be required to actually try working at a job.
Then if it proves detrimental he may quit without loss of com-
pensation.1
4
Morals in Suitability. The question of moral suitability in-
volves a religious issue. Originally, a claimant who refused a job
because some aspect thereof was contrary to his religious and/or
moral convictions, was disqualified as having rendered himself
unavailable.' 5 This is no longer the case. The difficulty of testing
for sincerity of convictions has been a great factor in moving
courts from the callous attitude originally manifested, to the
more humane view now taken of this ground for refusal. 16 One
9 Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., supra n. 3; Hallahan v. Riley, supra
n. 5; Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., supra n. 5.
10 Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co., 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N. E. 2d 439,
165 A. L. R. 1373 (1946); Tary v. Board of Review, Bureau of Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 161 Ohio St. 251 (1954); Bigger v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission, supra n. 8.
1 See Suska v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, supra n. 4,
where a refusal on the basis of a medical report stating that the doctor
thought that the claimant's condition might be aggravated by the job was
held to be insufficient.
12 In Glen Alden Coal v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
171 Pa. Super. 325, 90 A. 2d 331 (1952), the claimant never worked inside a
mine although he did work just outside one. In this case, claimant refused
to work inside, due to fear that he would be killed, as several relatives had
been; this was held to be good cause and the work was considered not suit-
able.
'3 Claim of Di Stefano, 277 App. Div. 823, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 75 (1950).
14 Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., supra n. 3. Past experience support-
ing the contention then is unnecessary to test the proffered employment.
See, Sledzianowski v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 168 Pa. Super. 37, 76 A.
2d 666 (1950).
15 Kut v. Albers Super Mkts. Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N. E. 2d 643 (1946);
rehear, den. sub nom. Kut v. Unempl. Bureau of Comp. of State of Ohio,
329 U. S. 669, 67 S. Ct. 86, 91 L. Ed. 590 (1946).
16 The idea of inquiry into a claimant's beliefs, which sometimes may be
the only way an administrator has of fairly evaluating a claimant's sincerity,




may now refuse to allow his work week to be extended so as to
include his Sabbath day, and if discharged for this, he will re-
main eligible for benefits."
Prior Training and Experience. Duration of the unemploy-
ment appears to be the prime factor in the question whether or
not a job is appropriate to the skill and training of a claimant.
The consensus is that, as the period of unemployment becomes
prolonged, the situation demands a pragmatic approach, wherein
it is reasoned that the claimant can always accept what is avail-
able and then quit, to accept more advantageous employment
when and if he is able to find it.'5 Judgment of a claimant's skill
and training is based on his previous employment experience,
schooling, and work record. A refusal on the basis that the em-
ployment is not commensurate with claimant's skill and training
may, according to the circumstances of the particular case, dis-
qualify the claimant on grounds of lack of availability.
Prior Earnings. Refusal of a job because the wage is too low
will, in many instances, disqualify a claimant. A common ex-
ample is the situation where an employee refuses a lower paying
job in lieu of being laid off, only to find that he is then disquali-
fied because of his failure to accept the reduced wage. 19 In gen-
eral, a refusal on the wage basis can be made only if the wage
offered represents a substantial decrease. As to what constitutes
a substantial decrease, the court ruled in Groner v. Corsi2° that
an employee would be justified in refusing jobs paying one-third
to one-half of the previous wage, or where there was a strong in-
dication that a position almost identical to the one previously
held soon would be available.21
(Continued from preceding page)
was attacked as unconstitutional. It was resolved, however, in Fowler v.
R. I., 345 U. S. 67, 73 S. Ct. 526, 97 L. Ed. 828 (1953), that although the gov-
ernment may not discriminate against individuals because of their religious
views, it is proper to inquire into a claimant's beliefs in order to determine
the credibility of his assertions. See also re the Establishment clause of the
Constitution, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed.
2d 393 (1961).
17 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963); law cannot con-
stitutionally be applied in such a way as to force a worker to choose be-
tween compensation benefits or abandonment of the cardinal rules of her
religion.
18 W. T. Grant Co. v. Bd. of Rev. of Unempl. Comp. Comm. of New Jersey,
129 N. J. L. 402, 29 A. 2d 858 (1943); Heater v. Corsi, 270 App. Div. 311, 59
N. Y. S. 2d 793 (1946).
19 Fegely v. Empl. Comp. Bd. of Rev. of Pa., 192 Pa. Super. 141, 159 A. 2d
574 (1960).
20 Groner v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 1021, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 194 (1944).
21 Ibid.
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The "prevailing wage" rule of the labor standards provisions
allows a wage-based refusal where the pay in the new job is less
than that prevailing in the community.2 2 If, however, the offer
is one of a former job, at the rate at which the claimant had per-
formed the said job during the last base period, the wages will be
deemed apparently adequate even though lower than those gen-
erally prevailing. 23
When new work is involved, and when the "prior earnings"
test is applied, if the wage is substantially below the prior earn-
ings or the prevailing wage the job may be rejected. The length
of time considered in applying the prior earnings test varies con-
siderably. It may be as short as three days or as long as seven
months, or more. The probable expectancy of high paying em-
ployment varies inversely with the length of time of unemploy-
ment; ergo, a claimant must eventually lower his sights or be
held disqualified by reason of lack of availability.
Wages are not the sole remunerative aspect considered by
a claimant. The claimant will certainly also consider that area
of ever-growing importance-fringe benefits. This aspect is not
generally considered by administrators at present; however, it
may well be a proper area for consideration by administrators
as well as by claimants.
Union Aspects. The Labor Standards Provisions which the
states must incorporate into their statutes in order to receive a
tax offset say that a claimant may refuse a job if, as a condition
of being employed, he would have to join a company union or re-
sign from or refrain from joining any bona fide organization. The
Provisions further specify that he need not accept the job if the
wage is below the prevailing scale. However, except in highly
unionized areas, a claimant's disqualification on grounds of un-
availability is automatic where he restricts his availability to
union jobs and union wages. Obviously, the decision must be
made with regard for the degree of unionization in the market
area, for upon this will depend the actual degree of restriction
which the claimant seeks to place upon his availability.
Transportation, Location, and Distance. The decisions are
strict concerning location, transportation, and distance. A claim-
ant is generally disqualified if he refuses on these grounds. The
administrator decides the extent of the market area, and the
22 Labor Standards Div., I. R. C., Sec. 3304 (a) (5) (1954).




claimant must be available for any and all suitable jobs therein.
A claimant will not be required to go beyond the market area.
24
Lack of transportation, poor transportation, or loss of trans-
portation,2 5 are not accepted as excuses for refusal of a job;
neither is fear of the neighborhood surrounding the place of em-
ployment sufficient to allow refusal.2 6 If a claimant cannot get
transportation for himself he usually is considered to be not
available.27
Where claimants have moved from the market area, leaving
jobs for that reason, they have been declared ineligible for com-
pensation at their new locations.28 In determining whether or not
work was suitable, the administrator considers, with respect to
distance qualifications, the distance between the work abandoned
and the old residence. Some states (Ohio for example29) have
revised their statutes to allow for moving from the market area.
In others the claimant's loss of eligibility is temporary and can
be overcome by meeting the availability requirements in the new
location.3 0
Labor Disputes and Lockouts. A "labor dispute" is a con-
troversy concerning terms or conditions of employment such as
wages, hours, working conditions, or matters related to collective
bargaining. It may be caused by either the employer or the em-
ployee. A "lockout" is caused by management, and in some
jurisdictions is not considered to be a dispute. However, the ma-
jority view is that it is a dispute. This is important in determin-
ing whether or not a claimant falls within the statutory provisions
which provide that a labor dispute must be in progress in order
24 Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Lazar, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P. 2d 405
(1943).
25 Kontner v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. of Ohio, 148 Ohio St. 614,
76 N. E. 2d 611 (1947).
26 Beall v. Bureau of Unemp. Comp. of Ohio, 60 Ohio Abs. 444, 101 N. E. 2d
780 (1951).
27 Kontner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, supra n. 25;
81 C. J. S., Social Security and Public Welfare, Sec. 208; but if travel in-
volves expense substantially greater than before, unless provision is made
for reimbursement, it may be proper grounds for refusal, as in: Claim of
Canale, 277 App. Div. 960, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 634 (1950).
28 Call v. Luten, 219 Ark. 640, 244 S. W. 2d 130 (1951); Wolf's v. Iowa Empl.
Security Comm., 244 Iowa 999, 59 N. W. 2d 216 (1953); Brown-Brockmeyer
Co. v. Holmes, 152 Ohio St. 411, 89 N. E. 2d 580 (1949) where one regularly
employed removed to a point where work was unavailable while his former
employment continued to be available.
29 Ohio Rev. Code, See. 4141.29.
30 Dept. of Labor and Industry of Pa., Bur. of Empl. and Unempl. Comp. v.
Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 154 Pa. Super 250, 35 A. 2d 739 (1944).
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for the provisions to be applicable. A job may not be refused on
this ground unless a dispute has resulted in work stoppage; the
fact that a dispute is imminent is not a sufficient excuse.
The Labor Standards Provisions allow a claimant to refuse
new work which arose as a direct result of a dispute; however,
strikers are not entitled to benefits. After a strike is broken by
resumption of production by strikebreakers, a refusal to return
to work has been held to be good and proper cause, rendering the
employees legally unemployed from that time on.31
Ill Health. Under the provisions of the unemployment com-
pensation statutes, one must be able to work and be available
for work in order to be entitled to unemployment benefits.8 2 A
claimant who is not able to accept substantial employment be-
cause of ill health is not available for work. 3 Unemployment in-
surance, it must be remembered, is not health insurance.3 4 Thus,
for example, one unemployed because of pregnancy is not eligible
any more than one unemployed for any other health reason.3 5
Conclusion. In general, what constitutes good cause for re-
fusal of proffered employment must be determined from the facts
in each case.86 The rules in determining qualification for benefits
under unemployment insurance provisions do permit some con-
sideration of individual preference in that a claimant may refuse
"suitable" work for "good cause." 37 However, these rules are not
so well-defined as to make for easy determinations.
31 Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P. 2d 528 (1947).
82 81 C. J. S., Social Security and Public Welfare, Sec. 202.
33 Id. at Sec. 205; see also: Borough of Hasbrouck Heights v. Division of Tax
Appeals, 48 N. J. Super. 328, 137 A. 2d 585 (1958); State v. Hix, 132 W. Va.
516, 54 S. E. 2d 198 (1949); Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Review,
Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. 2d 152 (1942).
84 Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Allen, 365 S. W. 2d 302 (Ky.,
1963); Rivers v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 323 Mass. 339, 82
N. E. 2d 1 (1948).
85 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm.,
320 Mich. 358, 31 N. W. 2d 83 (1948); but see, Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Carnley,
35 Ala. App. 46, 44 So. 2d 622, cert. den. 253 Ala. 426, 44 So. 2d 627, 14
A. L. R. 2d 1301 (1949), wherein a statute provided that if a woman was
unable to work three months before and three months after a childbirth,
she might again become eligible on expiration of three months after the
birth.
86 Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
Dept. of Labor and Industry of Pa., 356 Pa. 43, 50 A. 2d 336 (1947); 81
C. J. S., Social Security and Public Welfare, Sec. 200.
87 For a definition of what constitutes "good cause" and "suitability," as
well as for an interesting discussion of refusal to work and the administra-
tion of Taft-Hartley and unemployment compensation law, see, Mandelker,
Refusals to Work and Union Objectives in the Administration of Taft-
Hartley and Unemployment Compensation, 44 Cornell L. Q. 477 (1959).
Sept., 1964
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